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Abstract 
We analyze whether efficiency wages operate in urban labor markets, within the 
framework proposed by Ross and Zenou (2008), in which shirking at work and leisure 
are assumed to be substitutes. We use unique data from the American Time Use Survey 
(ATUS) that allow us to analyze the relationships between leisure, shirking, commuting, 
employment, and earnings. We confirm that shirking and leisure are substitutes, and 
present an estimate of this relationship, representing the only empirical test of the 
relationship between a worker’s time endowment and shirking at work. Our findings 
point to the existence of efficiency wages in labor markets. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we analyze the spatial distribution of US employment, using data for the 
United States for the period 2003-2014. Employment and wages have been studied in a 
variety of frameworks, with one approach being the theory of efficiency wages, in 
which firms are willing to pay workers more than expected to promote efficiency and 
discourage shirking at work (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). However, these authors 
identify the problem of setting efficiency wages when workers’ time endowment is 
unobserved, since the value of shirking depends upon the time endowments. Following 
this approach, Ross and Zenou (2008) use expected commuting time as a shock to the 
time endowments to indirectly test the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) phenomena, which is 
the only test of this phenomena to date. Specifically, Ross and Zenou (2008) develop a 
model to examine the effects of commuting on employment and wages, in which the 
behavioral substitution between leisure time and effort at work is allowed. According to 
this model, employees who devote comparatively more time to commuting have 
comparatively less time to devote to leisure activities, and thus have incentives to shirk 
at work, which decreases their effort at work. However, a key theoretical ambiguity 
emerges from this model, as it is not known whether shirking at work and leisure are 
complements or substitutes and the authors derive all their results from the assumption 
that leisure and shirking at work are, indeed, substitutes 
Our primary goal is to directly analyze the empirical relationship between shirking at 
work and leisure, and thus identify a key parameter that is necessary to test the 
efficiency wage hypothesis, using employment, wages, and leisure. To that end, we use 
the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) for the years 2003-2014, which allows us to 
observe the hours of work, and also to determine whether (and to what extent) non-work 
activitiesare performed during work hours. Such non-work activity during work hours is 
a key dimension of shirking, that is emphasized by Ross and Zenou (2008) as being 
especially sensitive to commuting time. We analyze how much time workers spend in 
non-work activities during their work schedules, and whether shirking at work (i.e., 
non-work activities done in the work place, such as internet shopping, managing 
household finances, or internet use on social networks) and leisure are complements or 
substitutes. We find evidence of substitutability between leisure and shirking at work, a 
critical assumption made in the current framework. 
Following the theoretical framework, the negative relationship between leisure and 
shirking at work implies that commuting time has a negative relationship with leisure, 
while commuting has a positive relationship with shirking at work. We find that 
commuting time and leisure have a negative relationship for both supervised and non-
supervised occupations. We also find that the positive relationship between commuting 
time and shirking time is only found in non-supervised occupations, which may indicate 
that the payment of efficiency wages, in concert with supervision, reduces the 
incentives to shirk in supervised occupations. Thus, our results are consistent with the 
theoretical model. Furthermore, we analyze the relationship between commuting time, 
unemployment, and wages, and find that commuting time presents positive and 
statistically significant correlations with unemployment and wages. 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we analyze the relationship 
between shirking at work and leisure, which is our main contribution. The Ross and 
Zenou (2008) model identifies a key theoretical ambiguity in this relationship, and no 
empirical analyzes have been done, so far, to determine the direction and magnitude of 
this relationship. We offer a precise estimation of the magnitude of this relationship, 
providing empirical support to Ross and Zenou (2008). Second, we complement prior 
results for employment and wages. Our results show positive relationships between 
commuting time, on the one hand, and unemployment and wages, on the other, which is 
consistent with urban efficiency wage theories. Thus, we offer updated evidence of the 
spatial distribution of US wage employment and individual earnings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
theoretical background. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 contains an analysis 
of the relationships between shirking at work and leisure time. In Section 5, we show 
the results regarding commuting, shirking at work, leisure, employment, and wages, and 
Section 6 presents our main conclusions. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The relationship between employment, earnings, and commuting has been widely 
studied. Examples of analyses of employment and commuting can be found in White 
(1977), Zax and Kain (1991), Clark and Withers (1999) and Rouwendal and Meijer 
(2001), where the importance of housing/residential decisions is highlighted.1The 
Spatial Mismatch Theory (Kain, 1968) argues that poor labor market outcomes are 
partly the result of spatial separation between work and places of residence, and its 
effects on unemployment have been studied in Brueckner and Zenou (2003) (the 
contributions in this field are reviewed in Gobillon, Selod and Zenou, 2007). Patacchini 
and Zenou (2007) show the growing spatial dependence of unemployment rates, and 
Picard and Zenou (2015) find that minority groups have higher unemployment rates, 
independently of where they are located. 
The effect of commuting on wages has also been studied, finding positive and robust 
associations. For instance, Leigh (1986) was one of the first to study compensating 
wages due to commuting, finding positive evidence, especially for white workers. Other 
authors analyzing the effects of commuting on wages are Zax (1991), White (1999), 
Rupert, Stancanelli, and Wasmer (2009), Fu and Ross (2013) and Mulalic, van 
Ommeren, and Pilegaard (2014). Brueckner, Thisse, and Zenou (1997)study the 
location of individuals in cities by income, finding that the availability of amenities in 
the various areas of the city is related to the location of the wealthy. 
Among the different frameworks established to analyze these economic outcomes, 
the theory of urban efficiency wages is a common approach. According to efficiency 
wage models, salaried workers receive higher wages than expected from the labor 
market equilibrium, as firms are willing to pay workers more to promote efficiency and 
discourage shirking at work. However, firms do not pay enough to eliminate all shirking 
at work if they do not observe individual time endowments (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). 
The urban efficiency wage models include a spatial pattern, where place of work and 
place of residence play an important role in determining how employment and 
unemployment are spatially distributed. One important factor in this framework is the 
distance from the place of residence to the workplace, which determines the time 
devoted to commuting. Thus, a key factor in urban wage efficiency models is 
commuting, which affects employment and wages. 
We take the model of Ross and Zenou (2008) as our reference theoretical framework, 
where workers’ residential locations remain fixed as they enter and leave 
unemployment. These authors establish an instant utility function of workers that 
depends on a non-spatial composite good(Z) consumed by the employed, and a function 
(V(.)) that depends on leisure and effort at work, and considers that effort and leisure 
are not independent activities.2In this sense, the authors’ key assumption is that shirking 
at work and leisure are substitutes, as follows: low leisure at home may imply that the 
worker has less time for rest and relaxation and is more pressed for time at home, and 
thus the benefit of taking leisure (or conducting home production) while at work 
increases.3 No empirical analyses have been done, to date, to test this assumption (i.e., 
leisure and shirking at work are substitutes), where we would expect a negative 
relationship between leisure and shirking at work. Following this assumption, the model 
establishes that longer commuting time implies less time available for leisure (a 
negative relationship between commuting and leisure time), which increases the 
benefits of shirking at work (a positive relationship between commuting and shirking 
time).  
In Ross and Zenou (2008), two scenarios are considered.4 The first refers to a 
situation where firms do not observe worker’s location, and the authors establish three 
propositions. Proposition 1considers that workers who reside close to their jobs will 
choose not to shirk (i.e. will provide more effort), whereas workers located farther away 
will shirk (i.e. will provide less effort). Proposition 2 establishes that higher wages 
reduce the fraction of shirkers in the city, in the sense that, when wages are higher, 
fewer workers will shirk since there are more incentives not to do so. In equilibrium, the 
authors find that employment is lower when commuting times are longer (i.e., 
unemployment and commuting times should have a positive relationship). This labor 
market equilibrium is compatible with the existence of a certain degree of shirking at 
work, as firms will always want to allow some degree of shirking at work (Proposition 
3). 
The second scenario of the model considers that firms observe workers’ locations. In 
this scenario, firms can know the commuting time of workers, and thus it is optimal for 
firms to wage-discriminate in terms of location and not allow shirking at work in 
equilibrium. Wages are higher when commuting times are longer, given that if leisure 
and effort are substitutes, wages must compensate workers who live farther away, since 
they commute more and thus have less time for leisure at home (Proposition 4). As a 
result, wages increase with distance to jobs; that is, we would expect a positive 
relationship between commuting time and wages. 
In summary, three aspects of the model are to be tested: 1) a negative relationship 
between shirking and leisure time (i.e., shirking and leisure are substitutes, a key 
assumption of the model), 2) a negative association between commuting and leisure 
time, and positive associations between commuting time, shirking time, and wages 
(longer commuting times imply less leisure time, which induces shirking at work, 
encouraging firms to pay higher wages), and 3)a positive association between 
unemployment rates and (expected) commuting time, as shirking incentives increase in 
the (expected) commuting time. 
 
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
We use the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) for the period 2003-2014 to analyze 
the relationship between shirking at work and leisure, along with the links between 
commuting time, on the one hand, and shirking time, leisure time, employment, and 
wages, on the other. Respondents fill out a diary, and the ATUS thus provides us with 
information on individual time use, including information that can be used to compute 
the time devoted to shirking at work, leisure, and commuting time. The database also 
includes certain personal, family, demographic, and labor variables. The ATUS is 
administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and is considered the official time use 
survey of the United States (more information can be found at http://www.bls.gov/tus/). 
The advantage of our data over surveys based on stylized questions is that diary-based 
estimates are more accurate (Juster and Stafford, 1985; Robinson, 1985; Bianchi et al., 
2000; Bonke, 2005; Yee-Kan, 2008). 
Our sample consists of employed and unemployed respondents between 16 and 65 
years of age.For employed individuals, we restrict the analysis to working days, defined 
as days individuals spend more than 60 minutes working (excluding commuting), which 
allows us to avoid computing zero minutes of commuting for any worker who filled out 
the time use diary on a non-working day.5One of the relationships to be tested is 
between commuting and unemployment, and in this analysis we include in our sample 
both the employed and the unemployed. For the analysis of the relationship between 
shirking and leisure time, and between commuting, shirking, leisure, and wages, we 
restrict the sample to workers only.6 The final sample consists of 33,360 employed 
individuals, and 5,651 unemployed individuals. 
According to Ross and Zenou (2008), workers can be divided into white collar 
workers and blue collar workers; that is, slightly supervised workers and heavily 
supervised workers, respectively. Ross and Zenou (2008) base their classification on 
Levenson and Zoghi (2006), whose authors identify a clear break in the pattern of 
supervision, with all major white collar occupations having a predicted supervision 
level between 0.62 and 0.66, and all major blue collar occupations having a predicted 
level of supervision between 0.34 and 0.45, on a scale between zero and one where one 
implies independence from supervision. The ATUS includes information on 
occupations, with a ten-category classification: 1) Production, 2) Construction and 
extraction, 3) Installation and maintenance, 4) Transportation and materials, 5) Farming, 
fishing, and forestry, 6) Office and administrative, 7) Services, 8) Professional and 
related, 9) Sales, and 10) Management and business. Within this framework, we 
consider slightly supervised occupations (i.e., non-supervised) to be the following: 
“Management, business and financial”, “Professional and related”, “Service”, and 
“Sales and related”. This leaves us with “Office and administrative support”, “Farming, 
fishing, and forestry”, “Construction and extraction”, “Installation, maintenance, and 
repair”, “Production” and “Transportation and material moving” as heavily supervised 
occupations (i.e., supervised).7 
The fact that we have information on the 24 hours of the day allows us to compute 
the total time devoted to shirking at work and to leisure, and discern the relationship 
between these two uses of time. We compute the time devoted to leisure by workers in 
our sample using the definition of Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla (2012) and Aguiar and 
Hurst (2007): activities such as watching television, sports, general out-of-home leisure, 
gardening and pet care, and socializing, not at work. For the time devoted to shirking at 
work (i.e., non-work activities), the data structure of the ATUS allows us to ascertain 
the time workers report not working while in the work place. We define shirking time as 
the total time spent at the workplace, but which is not defined as market work. For 
instance, time spent on leisure, personal care, or housework (e.g., online shopping) done 
at the workplace (location code, “place of work”) is included in the definition of 
shirking time.8 This definition of shirking time is related to the “loafing” time described 
in Burda, Genadek and Hamermesh (2015), defined as the time spent by workers in 
non-work activities while on the job. 
(PLACE TABLE 1 HERE) 
Table 1 shows a descriptive analysis of leisure and shirking time, for all workers 
and by group of supervision. We observe that average leisure and shirking times are 
88.78 and 27.54 minutes per day, with standard deviations of 87.78 and 34.78, 
respectively. Thus, workers in the US spend around 30 minutes per working day in 
shirking activities. By group of workers, we find that workers in occupations with 
supervision spend 86.21 and 35.66 minutes in leisure and shirking activities, while 
workers in occupations without supervision spend 90.21 and 23.05 minutes in these 
activities, respectively. Thus, in comparison to workers in occupations without 
supervision, those in occupations with supervision spend 4 fewer minutes per day in 
leisure activities and 12.61 more minutes per day in shirking activities, with this 
difference being statistically significant at the 99 percent level (p-values of the 
differences in characteristics based on a t-type test). Table 2 shows the means and 
standard deviations of the time devoted to shirking by workers, according to their 
occupation. By occupation, we find that workers in production occupations spend the 
most time (42.25 daily minutes) in shirking at work, while workers in management and 
business, and sales occupations spend the least time (17.83 and 20.45 daily minutes, 
respectively) in shirking at work. 
(PLACE TABLE 2 HERE) 
The ATUS also includes information on labor earnings, which allows us to 
compute the hourly wage of workers. We have defined “hourly earnings” directly as 
earnings per hour, if this data was available from ATUS; in other cases, we have 
defined it as earnings per week divided by the usual weekly working hours. Data 
collected in ATUS are in nominal terms, and thus we have transformed nominal hourly 
wages to real hourly wages by dividing nominal wages by the price deflator from the 
Federal Reserve, Bank of St. Louis. For workers in our sample, Table 1 shows that the 
average hourly earnings are $19.59, and the standard deviation is $17.60. 
We define other variables in order to control for the observed heterogeneity of 
individuals in the econometric analysis done in Sections 4 and 5. We consider the 
gender of respondents (male), potential years in the labor market (age minus number of 
education years and minus a fixed value, taken as 3), education level, being white, and 
being American, Asian, or Pacific Islander, living in couple, partner’s labor force status 
(a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the partner works), having children, 
and the number of individuals in the household. We consider three levels of education: 
“basic education” (less than high school diploma), “secondary education” (high school 
diploma), and “university education” (more than high school diploma), defining each as 
a dummy variable. We have also included “years in labor market squared” (Ross and 
Zenou, 2008), in order to measure non-linear effects. 
Table 1 shows a descriptive analysis of the variables, by group. In comparison with 
the unemployed, the employed have a higher probability of being women (52.7 percent 
vs 45.4 percent), have greater experience in the labor market (20.45 vs 19.27 years); a 
higher proportion of them have University education (63.3 percent vs 46.7 percent), and 
they are more likely to be white (82.4 percent vs 71.4 percent), although there is a 
higher proportion of Asian employees than unemployed (4.1 percent vs 2.7 percent). 
Regarding the variables related to household composition, we observe that, in 
comparison with the unemployed, employed workers have a greater probability of 
living in couple (60.4 percent vs 46.1 percent) and that their partners have a greater 
probability of being employed (45 percent vs 33.3 percent), have fewer children (53.6 
percent of the employees have children, vs 56.9 percent of the unemployed), and thus 
their households are smaller (2.9 members of the employees vs 3.1 of the unemployed). 
When we compare workers in occupations with and without supervision, we find that 
the former earn $5.90/hour less than the latter ($15.77/hour vs. $21.70/hour). 
Furthermore, workers in occupations with supervision show lower rates of University 
education, have longer experience in the labor market, and have a lower probability of 
having children, in comparison with workers in occupations without supervision. 
3.1 Descriptive evidence 
From the evidence presented in Tables 1 and 2, we can determine that the higher the 
shirking time the lower the leisure time, which points to leisure and shirking at work 
being substitutes. To test this relationship, we have directly analyzed the raw correlation 
between leisure and shirking time. Figure 1 plots the average time devoted to leisure, 
for each time devoted to shirking at work; that is, for all those diaries with the same 
amount of time devoted to shirking at work, we average the time devoted to leisure. We 
plot mean leisure time (y-axis) on the time devoted to shirking at work (x-axis). We 
have also added a linear fit of leisure time on shirking time. The linear fit shows a 
negative slope between leisure and shirking time, with the correlation between them 
being -0.242.We find positive evidence of the substitutability of leisure and shirking at 
work, which complements Ross and Zenou (2008) as, a priori, they do not know 
whether shirking at work and leisure are complements or substitutes.  
(PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE) 
If shirking at work and leisure are substitutes, it follows that commuting and 
shirking at work are positively related, while commuting and leisure are negatively 
related. Thus, we now analyze the relationships between commuting time, on the one 
hand, and leisure and shirking time, on the other. Commuting time is the time devoted 
to the activity “commuting to/from work”, coded as “180501” in the ATUS. Table 1 
shows the time devoted to commuting by workers in our sample. It can be seen that 
workers devote an average of 38.68 minutes per day to commuting, with workers in 
supervised and non-supervised occupations devoting 39.55 and 38.20 minutes per day, 
respectively. From Table 1,we find that workers in supervised occupations devote more 
time to commuting, which results in less time in leisure and more time in shirking at 
work, in comparison with workers in occupations without supervision. To test these 
relationships, we directly analyze the raw correlation between commuting, leisure, and 
shirking time. Figure 1 plots the average time devoted to commuting, for each time 
devoted to leisure, on the one hand, and for each time devoted to shirking at work, on 
the other. We plot mean leisure time, and mean shirking time (x-axis), on the time 
devoted to commuting (y-axis). We have also added a linear fit of leisure and shirking 
times on commuting time. We observe a negative slope between commuting and leisure 
times – the correlation between them is -0.169 – on the one hand, and a positive slope 
between commuting and leisure times – the correlation between them is 0.154 – on the 
other. We conclude that there is a negative association between commuting and leisure, 
and a positive association between commuting and shirking at work, consistent with 
Ross and Zenou (2008). 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of employment and unemployment rates, hourly 
wages, and commuting time in the US, from the ATUS. We observe that the 
employment rate has decreased, while the unemployment rate, hourly wages, and 
commuting time have increased over the period. The increase in commuting time in 
recent years is consistent with the findings of Kirby and LeSage (2009), McKenzie and 
Rapino (2011), and Gimenez-Nadal and Molina (2014, 2016).Apart from economic 
conditions, which influence employment and unemployment rates, among the 
explanations for these trends we can find the increase in commuting time, leading to 
increases in unemployment rates and hourly wages.  
(PLACE FIGURE 2 HERE) 
In summary, we find that the relationship between leisure and shirking at work is 
negative. Accordingly, the relationship between commuting and leisure is negative, and 
commuting has positive relationships with shirking time, unemployment, and 
wages,giving empirical support to the model ofRoss and Zenou (2008). However, in 
this analysis we do not control for other factors that may be affecting these 
relationships, and the evidence presents a first descriptive analysis. In the following 
Sections, we analyze these relationships, controlling for other factors. 
 4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHIRKINGAT WORK AND LEISURE 
According to the theoretical framework, the key assumption in the model is that leisure 
and shirking at work are substitutes, and thus we should find a negative relationship 
between them. Hence, we analyze the relationship between leisure and shirking time, 
once we control for other observed factors that may condition this relationship. To that 
end, we limit the sample to employed individuals only, and estimate Ordinary Least 
Squared (OLS) models of shirking time, as follows: 
        Shirking୧ୱ = α଴ + +αଵL୧ୱ + αଶX୧ୱ + αଷW୧ୱ + αୱ + ε୧ୱ   (1) 
where Shirkingis represents the (log) of shirking time of a given individual “i” living in 
Metropolitan Statistical Area(MSA)“s”, and Lis represents the(log) of leisure time of 
that individual. This specification of the model resembles that of Ross and Zenou 
(2008). X୧ୱ includes the set of socio-demographic characteristics described in Section 3, 
W୧ୱ represents housing attributes, αୱ represents MSA fixed effects, and ε୧ୱ represents 
random variables capturing unmeasured factors and measurement errors.9Given that the 
ability to shirk across occupations and industries may vary, we also include occupation 
and industry fixed effects in our estimates. Regarding the information on the attributes 
of the household unit (Wis), we consider the information on whether the housing unit is 
owned or not, with the following options: Owned or being bought by a household 
member; Rented for cash, and Occupied without payment of cash rent (reference 
category).Given the theoretical framework, we should expect thatαଵ < 0. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show the results of estimating Equation (1) for both 
supervised and non-supervised workers, respectively. We find that the time workers 
devote to leisure is negatively related to the time they devote to shirking at work, with 
this correlation being statistically significant at the 90 percent level in the case of the 
supervised workers, and at the 99 percent level in the case of the non-supervised 
workers. Specifically, we find that a decrease of 10 percent in leisure time is related to 
increases of 0.32 percent and 1.11 percent in the time that employees devote to shirking 
activities at work. Then, the less time devoted to leisure activities, the more time 
workers devote to shirking at work, which points to the validity of the main assumption 
of Ross and Zenou (2008). 
(PLACE TABLE 3 HERE) 
Furthermore, the negative relationship between shirking and leisure time is stronger 
for workers in non-supervised occupations, given its larger coefficient and higher level 
of significance. This difference may indicate that workers in non-supervised 
occupations find it easier to shirk at work, in comparison with supervised workers; once 
they are paid efficiency wages, workers in non-supervised occupations do not risk being 
fired when they shirk, while workers in supervised occupations may find it more 
difficult to shirk, due to monitoring. 
 
5. COMMUTING, SHIRKING AT WORK, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 
5.1. Commuting time, leisure and shirking 
We first analyze the relationship between commuting, and leisure and shirking time, 
which supposes the first empirical test on these relationships to the authors’ knowledge. 
From the theoretical framework, if leisure and shirking at work are substitutes, we 
would expect to find a negative relationship between commuting and leisure time, and a 
positive relationship between commuting and shirking time. We limit the sample to 
employed individuals only, and estimate OLS models: 
        T୧ୱ = α଴ + +αଵC୧ୱ + αଶX୧ୱ + αଷW୧ୱ + αୱ + ε୧ୱ   (2) 
where Tis represents the (log) leisure or shirking time of a given individual “i” living in 
MSA “s”, and Cis represents the (log) commuting time of that individual. The vectors 
Xis,Wis and αୱ are the same as in Equation (1). We also include occupation and industry 
fixed effects in our estimates. 
Columns (1) and (3) in Table 4 show the results of estimating Equation (2) on leisure 
and shirking time for workers in supervised occupations, and Columns (2) and (4) in 
Table 4 show the results of estimating Equation (2) on leisure and shirking time for 
workers in non-supervised occupations. We find that commuting time has a negative 
relationship with leisure for workers in both supervised and non-supervised 
occupations, with this relationship being statistically significant at the 99 percent level. 
An increase of 10 percent in the time devoted to commuting by workers is related to 
decreases in leisure time of 0.96 percent and 1.35 percent for workers in supervised and 
non-supervised occupations, respectively. A t-type test of the equality of coefficients 
does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of the equality of coefficients, and thus 
we cannot conclude that the magnitude of the relationship differs by the level of 
supervision. The negative relationship between commuting and leisure time contained 
in the model is confirmed by our results. 
(PLACE TABLE 4 HERE) 
One important ambiguity in the Ross and Zenou (2008) model is that they do not 
know the magnitude of the negative relationship between commuting and leisure. Time 
use data allows for the minimization of measurement error in both commuting and 
leisure time, and thus we can estimate the magnitude of this relationship by analyzing 
partial correlations. Results indicate that this relationship is less than 1, since the 
elasticity is lower than unity, and the confidence intervals at the 95 percent confidence 
level all include values lower than one (e.g., -0.114, -0.775 and -0.147, -0.122 for 
workers in supervised and non-supervised occupations, respectively). This evidence 
indicates that, as commuting time increases, workers adjust their hours of work to limit 
the reduction in their leisure. 
Focusing on the relationship between commuting and shirking time, we find mixed 
results, depending on the type of occupation. The conditional correlation between 
commuting and shirking time is positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent 
significance level for workers in non-supervised occupations, while it is not statistically 
significant in those occupations that can be considered as not supervised. For workers in 
non-supervised occupations, an increase of 10 percent in the time devoted to commuting 
is associated with an increase of 2.07 percent in the shirking time of workers. However, 
the correlation between commuting and shirking time for workers in supervised 
occupations indicates that an increase of 10 percent in the time devoted to commuting is 
associated with an increase of only 0.3 percent in shirking time. We find evidence that 
is consistent with Ross and Zenou (2008) regarding the relationship between 
commuting and shirking time, and our results indicate that workers in non-supervised 
occupations find it easier to shirk at work, in comparison with supervised workers. 
 
5.2. Commuting time, employment and wages 
We next focus on the relationship between commuting time and the hourly wages of 
employed workers. According to Ross and Zenou (2008), we should expect to find a 
positive relationship between commuting time and wages. These relationships are set in 
equilibrium under different scenarios (i.e., no observation, or observation of worker’s 
location, respectively), and hence the estimation of conditional correlations between 
commuting and earnings is sufficient to test the existence of efficiency wages. We 
estimate OLS models of the logarithm of hourly wages on commuting time.10 The 
statistical model is as follows: 
        WE୧ୱ = α଴ + +αଵC୧ୱ + αଶX୧ୱ + αଷW୧ୱ + αୱ + ε୧ୱ  (3) 
where WEis represents the (log) hourly wage of a given individual “i” living in MSA 
“s”, and Cis represents the(log) time devoted to commuting by that individual. The 
vectors Xis,Wis and αୱ are the same as in Equations (1) and (2). We also include 
occupation and industry fixed effects in our estimates.Given the theoretical framework, 
the relationship between commuting and wages is expected to be positive, αଵ > 0, 
consistent withthe existing literature (van Ommeren, van den Berg and Gorter, 2000; 
Ross and Zenou, 2008; Rouwendal and Nijkamp, 2004; Dargay and van Ommeren, 
2005; Susilo and Maat, 2007; Rupert, Stancanelli, and Wasmer, 2009; Gimenez-Nadal, 
Molina, and Velilla, 2015). 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show the results of estimating Equation (3) for the 
sample of workers in supervised and non-supervised occupations, respectively(see 
Table A3 in the Appendix for results of other socio-demographic variables). We find 
that commuting time is positively related to hourly wages for both supervised and non-
supervised occupations, with this relationship being statistically significant at the 95 
percent level. In particular, we find that an increase of 10 percent in commuting time is 
related to an increase in wages of 0.19 percent and 0.16 percent for workers in 
supervised and non-supervised occupations, respectively. A t-type test of the equality of 
coefficients does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of the equality of 
coefficients, and thus we cannot assume that the magnitude of the relationship differs by 
the level of supervision of the occupations. This evidence is consistent with the 
existence of efficiency wages in the US, as firms can discriminate wages in an attempt 
to avoid shirking, although shirking is not fully eliminated, as workers still devote time 
to shirking activities. 
(PLACE TABLE 5 HERE) 
Our results differ from those presented in Ross and Zenou (2008) because they find 
that efficiency wages only operate for occupations with high levels of supervision (e.g., 
blue collar workers). However, Ross and Zenou (2008) argue that results for lightly-
supervised occupations (e.g., white collar workers) are not robust, as their estimates 
may suffer from a weak instrument problem that biases the IV estimates towards OLS 
estimates. Within this framework, we choose to estimate OLS models for wages, given 
that the dataset allows for a more accurate measure of commuting time in comparison 
with prior research, and the use of predicted commuting would make this benefit 
marginal. Given that these relationships are obtained in the market equilibrium, we do 
not attempt to estimate causal effects, but rather we are interested in equilibrium 
relationships, and the estimation of conditional correlations using OLS models is 
sufficient to test for the relationships predicted by the model. Furthermore, a firm can 
choose between more supervision and higher wages to compensate for the commuting-
induced incentives to shirk. Accordingly, commuting should induce higher wages in 
occupations where firms cannot supervise. In contrast, in occupations where supervision 
is possible, firms can partly offset the necessary wage increases by increased offshoring. 
Thus, theoretically, there is no reason to think that commuting may have a stronger 
effect on wages in supervised occupations compared to occupations where supervision 
is not feasible. 
Finally, we analyze the relationship between the employment and commuting time of 
individuals, where a negative relationship is expected. One important issue is that 
commuting time is not observed for the unemployed, which leads to selection bias. 
Thus, we must predict the commuting times of unemployed individuals and, to that end, 
we follow Ross and Zenou (2008) and apply an approach based on the identification of 
the effect of location (i.e., commuting) on outcomes, using cross-metropolitan 
variations (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997).11Ross and Zenou (2008) identify the effect of 
commuting time by the exclusion from the labor market equation of certain factors that 
can explain commuting time differences. With this approach, the source of variation for 
identification comes from cross-metropolitan area differences in commuting times (see 
Ross and Zenou, 2008, for a discussion of this approach). 
But we cannot estimate specific models of commuting time for each MSA 
individually, as there are several MSAs with less than 30 observations and we must be 
cautious in making estimates for specific metropolitan areas. Alternatively, we interact 
the housing stock variables with region variables included in the ATUS, exploiting 
systematic differences between the structure of metro areas in different regions of the 
country. In particular, we interact the information regarding ownership (i.e., owned, 
rented, other) with the information on census region of residence (i.e., Northeast, 
Midwest, South, West), and thus the model is identified by the exclusion from the labor 
market equation of the interaction of region Fixed Effects with the housing stock 
variables. We estimate an OLS model on commuting time, and we then predict 
commuting times for both the employed and the unemployed.12 
For the relationship between commuting and employment, we estimate an OLS 
model as follows:13 
E୧ୱ = β଴ + βଵCనୱ෢ + βଶX୧ୱ + βଷW୧ୱ + αୱ + ε୧୪ୱ   (4) 
where, for a given individual “i” living in MSA “s”, E୧ୱis the dummy variable 
“employed” that takes value “1” if he/she is an employed worker, and value “0” if 
he/she is unemployed.Cనୱ෢  represents the log of commuting time of individual“i” living 
in MSA “s”, predicted using the commuting model described in the previous paragraph. 
The vectors Xis, Wis and αୱ are the same as in Equations (1), (2) and (3).Given our 
theoretical framework, we expect commuting time to have a negative relationship to 
employment, βଵ < 0. We bootstrap the standard errors of the regressions, given that we 
are using generated variables in the model (Pagan, 1984; Murphy and Topel, 2002; 
Gimenez-Nadal and Molina, 2016), and we produce 500 replications of the model, 
where a random sample with replacement is drawn from the total number of 
observations. 
Column (3) of Table 5 shows the results of the key explanatory variables when we 
estimate Equation (4) for the employment regression without including commuting 
time, while Column (4) shows the results for employment when we include predicted 
commuting time. We find that commuting time presents a negative and statistically 
significant correlation with the probability of being employed.14 Specifically, we find 
that an increase in commuting time of 10 percent is associated with a decrease in the 
probability of employment of 0.6 percent. These results are consistent with Ross and 
Zenou (2008), and can be interpreted as that employed workers are located closer to 
work places, compared to the unemployed from their potential work places. 
Regarding the consistency of our results, when we compare the coefficients from 
Columns (3) and (4), we observe that the introduction of an imputed variable does not 
significantly bias the estimated coefficients, as coefficients for the other explanatory 
variables do not vary much, and their statistical significance remains. However, the 
limitation of the data regarding housing attributes may mean that these variables do not 
contain sufficient variation to identify the coefficients of commuting, leading to a 
problem analogous to the weak instrument problem.15Ross and Zenou (2008) 
acknowledge that they suffer from a weak instruments problem, and thus commuting 
time estimates trend toward zero, as estimates with weak instruments are biased towards 
the OLS estimates (Bound et al., 1995; Zivot, Startz and Nelson, 1998). Thus, we have 
reasons to believe that our results are also biased toward zero, and we are offering a 
lower bound of the relationship. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Analyses of employment and earnings and their spatial distribution are common, and a 
rich literature on the interactions with commuting time has emerged, where efficiency 
wage theory represents an important strand in this field of research. In this paper, we 
use a framework based on the model of Ross and Zenou (2008)on efficiency wages, 
where behavioral substitution between leisure time and effort at work is allowed. The 
relationship between leisure and shirking at work has not been previously analyzed, and 
we shed light on this relationship. We find positive evidence of the substitutability 
between leisure and shirking at work, and thus we offer a precise estimation of the 
magnitude of this relationship and provide empirical support to the Ross and Zenou 
(2008) assumption. Furthermore, our results confirm all the relationships derived from 
the model. We find that commuting time has a negative relationship with leisure, while 
it has a positive relationship with shirking time. Additionally, we find that commuting 
time presents positive relationships with unemployment and wages, which can be 
interpreted as evidence of efficiency wages, as firms can discriminate wages in terms of 
location in an attempt to deter shirking. 
Furthermore, the shirking time of non-supervised occupations is affected by 
commuting time, perhaps because they do not risk being fired if they shirk. If workers 
are not supervised, with longer commuting times they have less leisure time and should 
thus be more likely to shirk (as shirking and leisure are substitutes). Being non-
supervised, they do not risk their jobs, so they are not deterred from shirking. On the 
contrary, the shirking time of supervised occupations is not affected by commuting 
time, which is consistent with the fact that, if workers are paid efficiency wages, then 
firms would pay higher wages when commuting distance increases, to discourage 
shirking. Due to the higher wages, workers’ incentives to shirk decline, so there is no 
net effect on shirking time 
Other authors have analyzed commuting and wages, such as in the Ross and Fu 
(2013) model of agglomeration economies. These authors find that wage premia arise 
from location differences (both agglomeration and productivity), finding a positive 
association between workplace agglomeration and wages, robust to residential location 
fixed effects. Their model implies that commuting should correlate with wages, in order 
to ensure that similar individuals have the same utility across different work locations, 
even though wages differ across these locations. The efficiency wage model has a 
different implication, because real wages vary based on individual commutes. The 
results presented in this paper regarding commuting, shirking, and leisure provide 
empirical support to the Ross and Zenou (2008) model on efficiency wages. Further 
analysis of the existence of efficiency wages in other countries is proposed as a 
promising line of research. 
Despite that we do not deal with causality, which may represent a limitation in the 
current context, the theoretical framework allows us to analyze conditional correlations, 
in order to test the model and determine whether efficiency wages operate in labor 
markets. However, in our analysis, we only consider the supply side of the job market, 
in the sense that only worker decisions are analyzed, and the demand side of job 
positions is not considered. This limitation is important in the current context, as for 
instance, the availability of jobs is important in determining whether individuals remain 
unemployed or prefer to be employed. Further analysis should extend our results by 
incorporating the supply side of the market. 
Finally, one limitation of the paper is that we have considered the amount of time 
devoted to non-work activities in the work place as a measure of shirking behavior. 
However, we must acknowledge that this is an incomplete measure of effort at work. 
Becker (1985) assumes that firms buy a package of time and effort (i.e., intensity of 
work) from each worker, and payments to workers are according to these two 
components. Thus, the first component refers to the amount of time devoted to work, 
while the second component refers to the intensity of workers while doing their work 
tasks. According to this definition of effort at work (amount of time and intensity of 
worked hours), shirking behavior could well affect the hours of work, the intensity of 
worked hours, or both. In the current context, we are only considering shirking behavior 
referred to hours of work, but the intensity of work is not taken into account, which may 
help to explain our result that, for workers in supervised occupations, shirking time is 
not affected by commuting time. Monitoring practices in supervised occupations imply 
thatsuch workers risk their jobs if they shirk, and they may find it more beneficial to 
modify the intensity of their work tasks. Further analysis should extend our results by 
incorporating this aspect. 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Renkow and Hoover (2000) empirically study urban change following the regional 
restructuring hypothesis and the deconcentration hypothesis, supporting the latter in 
opposition to the former. The regional restructuring hypothesis holds that employment 
opportunities have been dominant over spatial employment changes, while the 
deconcentration hypothesis proposes that such changes are due to consumer 
preferences. 
2. Two studies are relevant in this context. Van Ommeren and Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau 
(2011) analyze the effect of the length of the worker's commute on productivity, by 
examining whether the commute has a positive effect on absenteeism, considering 
absenteeism as the opposite to productivity. The authors find that absenteeism in 
Germany would be 15 percent to 20 percent less if all workers had a negligible 
commute, which is consistent with urban efficiency wage models. Burda, Genadek and 
Hamermesh (2015) study shirking (“not working at job”, or loafing) and 
unemployment, in a setting robust to the operation of efficiency wages, where wage 
compensations discourage workers from loafing. 
3. It is also theoretically possible that leisure and shirking are complementary concepts. 
Changes in commuting time (and thus in leisure) may distort social life and thus the 
more time devoted to commuting, the less quality of social life and benefits from 
leisure, implying fewer planned activities at home. This decline makes the demand for 
personal time activities decline, including the benefits derived from personal activities 
at work. Since there is less time for planned activities at home, there is more time 
available for relaxing, so relaxing time at work also declines. However, Ross and Zenou 
(2008) argue that the case where effort and leisure are complements is not consistent 
with the results shown in their paper (footnote 7). 
4. An intermediate scenario considers that firms partially observe workers’ locations. In 
this scenario, commuting time is only partially observed, in the sense that firms may 
observe residential location, but it is too costly for firms to determine the true commutes 
of workers. Firms will pay efficiency wages to reduce shirking, but they will not know 
the exact premium needed to compensate the workers. Within this framework, some 
workers will shirk, and the relationships between commuting, unemployment, and 
wages will hold with the existence of shirking. 
5. We have repeated the analysis without restricting by working days, but controlling 
for weekdays, and results are qualitatively the same. Results are available upon request. 
For the restriction to working days, we define the variable “market work time” as the 
time devoted to the sum of “work, main job (not at home)”, “working nec (not at 
home)”, “work-related activities nec (not at home)”, “work & related activities nec (not 
at home)” and “waiting work related activities (not home)”. 
6. Since there is no point in talking about efficiency wages in self-employment, as they 
do not receive wages, we restrict our sample of workers to those who are employees. A 
complete modeling and analysis of the relationship between commuting and self-
employment can be found in Gimenez-Nadal, Molina and Velilla (2017). 
7. We must highlight that the ATUS is not intended as a labor survey. Thus, information 
on occupation is only available for those who are employed, while there is no 
information on previous occupation for those who are not employed (i.e., inactive, 
unemployed, retired). That way, the type of supervision of individuals is only known for 
employed individuals, while it is not known for the unemployed. For this reason, in our 
analysis of unemployment, we cannot divide the analysis by the level of supervision, 
and we run the analysis for the employed vs. the unemployed. For the rest of the 
analysis (commuting, shirking, leisure, and wages), given that we focus on workers 
only, we divide the sample into supervised and non-supervised occupations. 
8. In a previous version of the paper, we also included the time devoted to work breaks 
and meals at work in the definition of shirking time. However, breaks and time for 
meals may be a standard part of work and it may be considered odd to mark these 
activities as shirking behavior. Results are consistent to the inclusion of these activities 
in our definition of shirking, and are available upon request. 
9. The information about the MSA of residence follows the US Census Bureau’s 
categorization of metropolitan areas. Despite that the Census Bureau's terminology for 
metropolitan areas, and the classification of specific areas, changes over time, the 
general concept is consistent: a metropolitan area consists of a large population center 
and adjacent communities that have a high degree of economic and social interaction. 
The geographic information included in the ATUS includes the metropolitan area of 
residence of individuals. 
10. An alternative approach is to estimate the causal effect of the commute on wages, 
where worker characteristics that affect commuting time, but not wages, are needed to 
identify the effect. Despite that we cannot talk about causality, Ross and Zenou (2008) 
establish that the analysis of conditional correlations is also valid in the current context. 
Prior research analyzing the causal effect of commuting on wages includes Mulalic, van 
Ommeren and Pilegaard (2014) and Freund et al. (2015). We estimate the 
transformation to logarithm because the distribution of the variable does not follow a 
normal distribution (see Figure A1 in the Appendix) and thus we try to normalize the 
variable by applying a log transformation. 
11. This approach has been applied in a variety of studies, including Evans, Oates and 
Schwab (1992), Cutler and Glaeser (1997), Hoxby (2007), Card and Rothstein (2007), 
and Ross and Zenou (2008). 
12. Sum stats of the housing and census region variables, and the results of the 
commuting model, can be found in Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix, respectively. 
13. We have alternatively estimated a Logit model on the probability of employment, 
and results are robust to the use of different econometric models. We thus rely on the 
OLS model, given that coefficients can be interpreted directly, and results for the Logit 
model are available upon request. 
14. Our results may, in principle, be affected by sample selection issues, as the selection 
of employed and unemployed individuals may lead to the existence of subgroups with 
low labor-market attachment. Thus, we have estimated our employment model with an 
alternative subsample, to minimize the share of individuals with a low labor market 
attachment. We have considered unemployed individuals who report looking for a job 
during the four weeks prior to the survey. Also, we have predicted the time devoted to 
commuting separately by gender, and by the level of education. Results are robust and 
are shown in Table A5 of the Appendix. 
15. We have tested the extent to which the instrument can be explained by observed 
predetermined attributes (e.g., gender, education), which would imply a source of bias. 
We have regressed predicted commuting time on the set of socio-demographic (Xis) 
variables used to predict commuting time (e.g., region fixed effects and type of 
ownership), and we then run an F-test for whether the demographics can explain 
expected commuting. We obtain that the F-test is significant. Thus, predicted 
commuting can be explained by observed predetermined attributes and so is likely to be 
correlated with unobserved attributes, which implies a source of bias. This is also the 
case in Ross and Zenou (2008), who argue that cross-metropolitan differences in the 
spatial distribution of owner-occupied housing is not clearly exogenous, and we 
acknowledge that our results for employment may be biased. 
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TABLE 1. Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Employed Unemployed Differences Supervised Non-supervised Differences 
VARIABLES Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Diff. p-value Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Diff. p-value 
             
Leisure time 88.782 87.778 - - - - 86.208 85.526 90.208 88.972 -4.000 (<0.001) 
Shirking time 27.543 34.784 - - - - 35.657 36.322 23.049 33.057 12.608 (<0.001) 
Commuting time 38.682 40.782 - - - - 39.554 40.923 38.198 40.696 1.356 (0.004) 
Hourly earnings 19.588 17.597 - - - - 15.772 9.625 21.702 20.429 -5.931 (<0.001) 
Being male 0.527 0.499 0.454 0.498 0.073 (<0.001) 0.623 0.485 0.473 0.499 0.150 (<0.001) 
Years working 20.454 11.546 19.275 12.704 1.179 (<0.001) 21.844 11.621 19.685 11.432 2.159 (<0.001) 
Years working squared 55.169 51.140 53.289 54.184 1.880 (<0.001) 61.218 53.316 51.817 49.578 9.401 (<0.001) 
Primary education 0.081 0.273 0.192 0.394 -0.111 (<0.001) 0.120 0.326 0.060 0.237 0.061 (<0.001) 
Secondary education 0.286 0.452 0.340 0.474 -0.055 (<0.001) 0.426 0.495 0.208 0.406 0.218 (<0.001) 
University education 0.633 0.482 0.467 0.499 0.166 (<0.001) 0.453 0.498 0.733 0.443 -0.279 (<0.001) 
Being white 0.824 0.381 0.714 0.452 0.111 (<0.001) 0.835 0.371 0.818 0.386 0.017 (<0.001) 
Being American 0.824 0.381 0.820 0.385 0.005 (0.393) 0.815 0.389 0.830 0.376 -0.015 (<0.001) 
Being Asian 0.041 0.197 0.027 0.161 0.014 (<0.001) 0.022 0.148 0.051 0.219 -0.028 (<0.001) 
Being Pacific Islander 0.002 0.044 0.003 0.055 -0.001 (0.120) 0.002 0.047 0.002 0.043 0.000 (0.525) 
Living in couple 0.604 0.489 0.461 0.499 0.143 (<0.001) 0.609 0.488 0.601 0.490 0.008 (0.136) 
Partner’s labor status 0.450 0.498 0.333 0.471 0.117 (<0.001) 0.438 0.496 0.457 0.498 -0.019 (0.001) 
Have children 0.536 0.499 0.569 0.495 -0.033 (<0.001) 0.526 0.499 0.541 0.498 -0.015 (0.009) 
Family size 2.941 1.486 3.098 1.600 -0.157 (<0.001) 2.975 1.527 2.922 1.463 0.053 (0.002) 
             
N. Observations 33,360 5,651   11,893 21,467   
 
Note: The sample (ATUS 2003-2014) is restricted to employees who work the diary-day (by supervision, if corresponding), or to unemployed individuals. Commuting, leisure 
and shirking times are measured in daily minutes. Working time is measured in weekly hours. Employed group collects salaried workers in private sector. Hourly earnings are 
measured in $US. Gender takes the value 1 for men and 0 for women. “Years working squared” is defined as the square of years working, divided into 10, in order to normalize 
the scale. Occupation, Industry, and MSA statistical summaries are not shown in this table. Differences are defined as the mean value of the correspondent variable for private 
sector employees (supervised employees), minus the corresponding value for the unemployed (non-supervised employees). T-test p-values for the mean differences in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. Leisure and shirking times, by occupation 
             Leisure time      Shirking time N. Obs 
OCCUPATIONS Mean SD Mean SD  
      
Management and business 91.838 86.989 17.828 28.894 8,581 
Professional and related 92.475 87.111 21.441 31.264 11,117 
Services 89.119 94.595 25.919 37.277 6,848 
Sales  93.719 91.443 20.455 30.535 4,936 
Office and administrative  85.481 83.106 30.735 34.494 5,498 
Farming, fishing, and forestry 90.306 88.244 32.387 37.638 346 
Construction and extraction 91.260 92.711 34.813 41.479 2,141 
Installation and maintenance 89.344 84.108 33.099 33.993 1,637 
Production 87.896 86.176 42.254 36.742 2,768 
Transportation and materials 89.918 93.660 32.480 39.955 2,399 
Note: The sample (ATUS 2003-2014) is restricted to private sector employees. Leisure and shirking times are measured in 
daily minutes. 
 TABLE 3. Estimates of the shirking-leisure relationship 
 (1) (2) 
 Log-shirking model 
VARIABLES Supervised Non-supervised 
   
Being male  0.157** -0.010 
 (0.074) (0.049) 
Years working 0.000 -0.018*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Years working sq. 0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Secondary ed. -0.036 -0.066 
 (0.051) (0.063) 
University ed. -0.262*** -0.366*** 
 (0.056) (0.058) 
Living in couple -0.047 -0.041 
 (0.039) (0.037) 
Family size 0.011 0.033** 
 (0.018) (0.015) 
Leisure  -0.032* -0.114*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) 
Constant 0.155 -9.837 
 (12.020) (18.836) 
   
Observations 11,893 21,467 
R-squared 0.072 0.042 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample (ATUS 2003-
2014) is restricted to private sector workers in supervised (Column 1) and 
non-supervised (Column 2) occupations. Dependent variables are the 
logarithms of daily minutes devoted to shirking. Leisure time is measured 
in log of minutes per day. All models control for housing attributes, MSA 
fixed effects, and industry and Occupation-MSA fixed effects. All 
standard errors are clustered at the Occupation-MSA level. Results for 
additional variables included in the regressions can be found in Table A3 
of the Appendix.* Significant at the 90% level. ** Significant at the 95% 
level. *** Significant at the 99% level.  
 TABLE 4. Estimates of the commuting-leisure and commuting-shirking relationships 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                                             Log-leisure model Log-shirking model 
VARIABLES Supervised Non-supervised Supervised Non-supervised 
     
Being male  0.091*** 0.159*** 0.154** -0.053 
 (0.034) (0.023) (0.070) (0.048) 
Years working -0.014* -0.027*** 0.001 -0.015*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Years working sq. 0.003* 0.006*** 0.001 0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Secondary ed. 0.056 0.031 -0.038 -0.074 
 (0.041) (0.074) (0.051) (0.065) 
University ed. 0.064 0.153** -0.264*** -0.371*** 
 (0.045) (0.065) (0.057) (0.062) 
Living in couple 0.182*** 0.179*** -0.052 -0.074** 
 (0.058) (0.041) (0.040) (0.036) 
Family size 0.050*** 0.041*** 0.009 0.024 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) 
Commuting  -0.096*** -0.135*** 0.003 0.207*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.023) (0.036) 
Constant -3.495 1.258 0.273 -12.674 
 (6.091) (3.833) (11.977) (18.504) 
     
Observations 11,893 21,467 11,893 21,467 
R-squared 0.032 0.042 0.072 0.058 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample (ATUS 2003-2014) is restricted to 
private sector workers in supervised occupations (Columns 1 and 3), and to private sector workers 
in non-supervised occupations (Columns 2 and 4). Dependent variables are the logarithms of the 
daily minutes devoted to leisure (Columns 1 and 2) and to shirking (Columns 3 and 4). 
Commuting time is measured in log of minutes per day. All models control for housing attributes, 
MSA fixed effects, and industry and Occupation-MSA fixed effects. All standard errors are 
clustered at the Occupation-MSA level. Results for additional variables included in the 
regressions can be found in Table A3 of the Appendix.* Significant at the 90% level. ** 
Significant at the 95% level. *** Significant at the 99% level. 
 
  
TABLE 5. Estimates of the commuting-employment and commuting-wages relationships 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log-wage models Employment models 
VARIABLES Supervised Non-supervised General Predicted 
commuting 
Being male  0.218*** 0.183*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 
 (0.036) (0.017) (0.004) (0.003) 
Years working 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years working sq. -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Secondary ed. 0.212*** 0.274*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.010) (0.008) 
University ed. 0.330*** 0.586*** 0.138*** 0.135*** 
 (0.045) (0.056) (0.010) (0.007) 
Living in couple 0.104*** 0.171*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.007) (0.006) 
Family size -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.014*** -0.018*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
Commuting 0.019** 0.016** - -0.059** 
 (0.009) (0.007) - (0.029) 
Constant 21.429*** 72.535*** 0.662*** 0.858*** 
 (3.921) (11.964) (0.028) (0.101) 
     
Observations 11,893 21,467 38,305 38,305 
R-squared 0.132 0.215 0.068 0.06 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the Occupation-MSA levelin parentheses of Columns 
(1) and (2),bootstrapped (n=500) standard errorsin parentheses of Columns (3) and (4). The 
sample (ATUS 2003-2014) is restricted to private sector workers in supervised (Column 1) and 
non-supervised (Column 2) occupations. The sample (ATUS 2003-2014) is restricted toprivate 
sector workers and to unemployed individuals (Columns 3 and 4). Dependent variables are the 
logarithm of hourly wages in $US (Columns 1 and 2), and the dummy “Being employed” 
(Columns 3 and 4). Expected commuting times for Column (4) are measured in log of minutes 
per day. Gender takes the value 1 for men and 0 for women. All models control for housing 
attributes and MSA fixed effects, Columns (1) and (2) also control for industry and Occupation-
MSA fixed effects. Results for additional variables included in the regressions can be found in 
Table A4 of the Appendix. * Significant at the 90% level. ** Significant at the 95% level. *** 
Significant at the 99% level. 
  
 
  
FIGURE 1: Relationship between commuting, leisure, and shirking 
Note: The sample (ATUS 2003-2014) is restricted to employed individuals. Commuting, leisure, and shirking are 
measured in minutes per day. 
FIGURE 2: Evolution of employment, commuting, and hourly earnings 
Note: The sample (ATUS 2003-2014) is restricted to employees. Average hourly earnings 
measured in Dollars per hour, deflated using the deflator of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
Commuting time is measured in minutes per day. 
